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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BECKER, Chief Judge. 
 
Kahli Ubiles unlawfully possessed an unregistered 
firearm while attending a crowded street festival in St. 
Thomas. Acting on an anonymous tip that Ubiles possessed 
a gun, local authorities also in attendance stopped and 
frisked him. The authorities' "Terry" search proved fruitful, 
and they seized the firearm and arrested him. The United 
States subsequently filed an indictment against Ubiles, who 
unsuccessfully moved to have the gun suppressed on the 
ground that it was seized unlawfully. A jury acquitted 
Ubiles of a federal charge and convicted him of the 
possession of an unregistered firearm, in violation of V.I. 
CODE ANN. tit. 14, S 2253(a). This appeal followed. 
 
Holding that the search and seizure of Ubiles was 
unlawful, we will reverse. The Terry stop in this case was 
not supported by reasonable suspicion "that criminal 
activity [was] afoot . . . ." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 
(1968). First, it is not a crime to possess a firearm in the 
Virgin Islands--even when standing in a crowd. Second, the 
anonymous tipster who approached the authorities had 
said nothing that would indicate that Ubiles possessed the 
gun unlawfully (e.g., without registration); that he was 
committing or about to commit a crime; or that he posed a 
threat to the officers or anyone in the crowd. Therefore, the 
stop and subsequent search were unjustified because the 
precondition for a Terry stop was not present in this case. 
In reaching this conclusion, we reject the Government's 
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contention that Ubiles had a lessened expectation of 
privacy because he was standing in a crowd. We will 
therefore vacate the conviction and remand for further 
proceedings.1 
 
I. 
 
The J'ouvert Carnival is a celebration that periodically 
takes place in the U.S. Virgin Islands. The carnival 
celebrates the sunrise, and hence begins before daybreak. 
J'ouvert festivities last until noon and are typically crowded 
and boisterous. Hundreds if not thousands of revelers 
dance in the streets and march in a parade, while local 
bands lead the procession playing music from a flatbed 
truck. J'ouvert celebrants often consume a great deal of 
alcohol. 
 
Virgin Islands Territorial Court Deputy Marshal Franklin 
Leonard attended the April 30, 1998 J'ouvert Carnival on 
the Island of St. Thomas. He was off-duty at the time, and 
was joined by a female friend and two on-duty police 
officers, Virgin Islands Police Chief Americus Jackson and 
Virgin Islands Deputy Police Chief Jose Garcia. At 
approximately 9:00 a.m., an elderly gentleman approached 
Deputy Marshal Leonard and the officers. Without 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Our Terry holding obviates the need to reach several other important 
questions inhering in this case. First, because of our Terry holding, we 
are able to assume arguendo that the informant's tip in this case was 
reliable, and therefore, we need not grapple with the fact that the Virgin 
Islands authorities relied on a face-to-face anonymous tip to stop and 
frisk Ubiles. Cf. Florida v. J.L., 120 S. Ct. 1375, 1380 (2000) (holding 
"that an anonymous tip lacking indicia of reliability . . . does not 
justify 
a stop and frisk whenever and however it alleges the illegal possession 
of firearm"); id. at 1381 (discussing the constitutional difference 
between 
the "anonymous telephone tip" made in J.L.  and an anonymous tip made 
"face to face") (Kennedy, J., concurring). Second, we do not address 
Ubiles's argument that the firearm statute under which he was 
convicted, see V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 14, S 2253(a), as well as a related 
statute defining certain terms in the firearm statute, see V.I. CODE ANN. 
tit. 23, S 470, are void for vagueness. Lastly, we do not decide whether 
the District Court erred in admitting at trial certain incriminating 
statements made by Ubiles, and in instructing the jury regarding the 
Virgin Island's firearm possession statutes. 
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identifying himself, he told Leonard that there was a young 
man in the crowd standing on the sidewalk near the sea 
plane shuttle buildings who had a gun in his possession. 
The anonymous informant pointed toward the man in 
question and described his clothing and appearance. The 
informant did not explain how he knew that the man had 
a gun. He also did not describe, at the time, anything 
suspect about the gun or anything unusual or suspicious 
about the man or his behavior. 
 
Deputy Marshal Leonard, followed by the two officers (but 
not the tipster), walked over to the young man--the 
defendant in this case--Kahli Ubiles. According to 
testimony elicited from Leonard at the suppression hearing, 
Ubiles exhibited no unusual or suspicious behavior when 
Leonard approached him or when Chief Jackson began 
talking to him. Leonard also testified that he could not tell 
when he approached Ubiles whether Ubiles was carrying 
any type of weapon. Leonard nevertheless conducted a pat- 
down search of Ubiles and found in Ubiles's possession a 
cutlass (or machete) and a loaded gun. The firearm was a 
Jennings Long Rifle .22 caliber semi-automatic pistol, 
model J-22. The pistol's serial number allegedly had been 
obliterated, and evidence adduced at Ubiles's subsequent 
criminal trial revealed that the firearm was unregistered. 
 
The United States subsequently charged Ubiles with 
possession of a firearm with an obliterated serial number in 
violation of federal law, 18 U.S.C. SS 922(k), 924(a)(1)(B); 
possession of an unregistered firearm in violation of Virgin 
Islands law, V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 14, S 2253(a); and escape 
from custody in violation of Virgin Islands law, V.I. CODE 
ANN. tit. 14, S 661. A federal grand jury returned a three- 
count indictment on these charges. After the indictment 
was obtained, the Government successfully moved to 
dismiss the escape from custody charge. 
 
Before trial, Ubiles moved to suppress certain evidence, 
including the firearm seized by Deputy Marshal Leonard. At 
a hearing on this motion, the Government presented no 
evidence suggesting that Leonard or Officers Jackson and 
Garcia knew anything about Ubiles other than the 
information with which the anonymous informant had 
provided them. Leonard stated that no one had told them 
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anything that would lead them to believe (1) that Ubiles 
posed a danger to himself, the other officers, or the crowd; 
(2) that Ubiles had brandished the gun or machete in his 
possession; or (3) that Ubiles did not have a license to carry 
the gun in his possession. See App. at 71-73. Leonard 
testified merely that he was "very concerned about the 
situation" and therefore stopped and frisked Ubiles. Id. at 
65. 
 
Based on this testimony, the District Court denied 
Ubiles's motion to suppress the J-22 seized from his 
person. In denying the motion to suppress the firearm, the 
District Court explained: 
 
       It's the night of--I think I can take judicial notice of-- 
       can be some heavy drinking. People are tired. 
 
        So the kind of information that was given by the 
       older gentleman to Marshal Leonard, that he had just 
       --pointing out the gentleman, describing the clothes 
       that the defendant was wearing, had a gun, was 
       enough reasonable suspicion for the law enforcement 
       officers, the Chief Deputy, Chief, and Marshal Leonard 
       to go over and question him in an investigative style. 
       Prudent thing to do. 
 
        And certainly it turned out to be very prudent in this 
       case for the officers' protection while they were 
       questioning the individual, to pat him down. 
 
        And that pat down produced [the J-22]. 
 
Id. at 104. 
 
Ubiles's case proceeded to trial. The Government 
introduced the J-22 into evidence and presented the 
testimony of Deputy Marshal Leonard; Brenda Mason, a 
Firearms Certification Officer with the U.S. Virgin Islands; 
and Ronald Lockhart, the anonymous informant (whose 
identity the Virgin Islands authorities had discovered 
shortly before trial). Leonard testified about seizing the 
weapon from Ubiles. Ms. Mason testified that after a 
thorough records search of St. Thomas and St. Johnfiles 
she had not found a firearm license for Ubiles's gun. She 
also stated that the Firearms Certification Officer for the 
District of St. Croix had found no such record. Lockhart 
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told the jury that at approximately 8:30 a.m., on April 30, 
he saw something that looked like a gun pass from another 
man to Ubiles. He testified that there were three to five 
minutes between the time he saw the gun and the time he 
spoke to the officers. However, Lockhart had not related 
these details to the officers when he gave his tip. He had 
told Leonard only that he had observed a man with a gun 
and described and pointed to that man for the officers. 
 
The jury found Ubiles not guilty of the federal charge-- 
possessing a firearm with an obliterated serial number--but 
guilty of the territorial charge of possessing an unregistered 
firearm. Ubiles filed a post-trial motion to vacate the 
conviction, which was denied. The District Court sentenced 
Ubiles to three years imprisonment, suspending all but six 
months of the sentence, and to supervised probation for a 
period of four years and six months.2 This appeal followed. 
The District Court of the Virgin Islands had jurisdiction 
under 18 U.S.C. SS 3231, 3241, and 48 U.S.C.S 1612(c). 
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291. We 
exercise plenary review of the District Court's decision to 
deny Ubiles's motion to suppress the firearm in question. 
See United States v. Hyde, 37 F.3d 116, 118 (3d Cir. 1994). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. We note that the District Court ordered that Ubiles's term of 
imprisonment be served consecutive to an unrelated criminal charge on 
which the Virgin Islands authorities were holding Ubiles. The Virgin 
Islands statute governing consecutive sentences for the violation of 
territorial statutes allows for the imposition of sentences "to be served 
. . . consecutively to any other sentence imposed at the same time or 
prior thereto." V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 5, S 3672(a) (2000) (emphasis added). 
Section 3672(a) does not speak of the imposition of sentences "to be 
served consecutively to any other charge brought  at the same time or 
prior thereto," nor would it seem appropriate to do so. Until a charge 
matures into a conviction and then a sentence, a suspect held on that 
charge is a mere detainee, and not a prisoner of the state serving a 
sentence in addition to which another sentence could be imposed 
consecutively. Therefore, the sentence in this case commenced as soon 
as it was imposed, on February 4, 2000. The sentence accordingly 
expired on August 4, 2000. However, inasmuch as the non-jail portion 
of the sentence remains, this appeal is not moot. 
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II. 
 
The Fourth Amendment prohibits "unreasonable searches 
and seizures . . . ." U.S. CONST. AMEND IV; see also Harris v. 
United States, 331 U.S. 145, 150 (1947). "What is 
reasonable depends upon all of the circumstances 
surrounding the search or seizure and the nature of the 
search or seizure itself." United States v. Montoya de 
Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537 (1985). The "general rule" is 
that "warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable 
. . . ." Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 133 (1990). The 
courts have, however, fashioned exceptions to the general 
rule, recognizing that in certain limited situations the 
government's interest in conducting a search without a 
warrant outweighs the individual's privacy interest. See, 
e.g, id.; Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 537-41. A Terry 
"stop and frisk" is one such exception. See Terry v. Ohio, 
392 U.S. 1, 20-22 (1968). 
 
A. 
 
Terry, and cases which follow it, make clear that "an 
officer may, consistent with the Fourth Amendment, 
conduct a brief, investigatory stop when the officer has a 
reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is 
afoot." Illinois v. Wardlaw, 120 S. Ct. 673, 675 (2000). To 
make a showing that he or she in fact had reasonable 
suspicion, "[t]he officer must be able to articulate more 
than an `inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or 
"hunch" of criminal activity.' " Id.  (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. 
at 27). 
 
A reasonable suspicion of criminal activity may be formed 
by observing exclusively legal activity. See id.  at 677; see 
also Terry, 392 U.S. at 22-23. In Wardlaw , for example, the 
officers who stopped the defendant were able to point to the 
fact that the defendant was standing in an area known for 
heavy narcotics trafficking and to the fact that he 
immediately fled the scene after seeing the officers arrive. 
See id. at 674. The Court "noted the fact that the stop 
occurred in a `high crime area' [counts] among the relevant 
contextual considerations in a Terry analysis." Id. at 676. 
The Court further noted that headlong flight, while not 
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"necessarily indicative of ongoing criminal activity," id. at 
677, was "suggestive" of "wrongdoing," id. at 676. The 
Supreme Court therefore held that, while both of the 
defendant's actions constituted legal behavior, they 
properly gave rise to the inference that criminal activity was 
afoot, given the totality of the circumstances. See id. at 
676-77. 
 
What remained the centerpiece of the Court's analysis, 
however, was whether the defendant's behavior pointed to 
the presence of illegal activity. Even though the officers' 
suspicion was grounded in evidence of purely legal activity, 
the Court held that the stop was lawful only because the 
defendant's behavior suggested that criminal activity was 
afoot. See id. at 676. We conclude Officer Nolan was 
justified in suspecting that Wardlow was involved in 
criminal activity, and, therefore, in investigating further.") 
(emphasis added). Had the defendant not fled on sight of 
the officers, and simply " `go[ne] about [his] business,' " 
there would have been no reason to suspect that he was 
engaged in criminal activity, and the officers would have 
had no justification to detain him. See id.  (citing Florida v. 
Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498 (1983)). 
 
Ubiles contends that the stop in this case was not 
supported by the type of reasonable suspicion required by 
Terry. He argues that, based on the facts presented to the 
officers by Lockhart at the J'ouvert Carnival, the officers 
had no reason to suspect that "criminal activity[was] afoot" 
at the time they decided to stop him. Terry, 392 U.S. at 30. 
We agree. 
 
B. 
 
Deputy Marshal Leonard and his compeers had no 
reason to believe that Ubiles was "involved in criminal 
activity . . . ." Wardlow, 120 S. Ct. at 676. It is not 
necessarily a crime to possess a firearm in the Virgin 
Islands, see V.I. CODE ANN . tit. 23, S 470; nor does a mere 
allegation that a suspect possesses a firearm, as dangerous 
as firearms may be, justify an officer in stopping a suspect 
absent the reasonable suspicion required by Terry, see 
Florida v. J.L., 120 S. Ct. 1375, 1379 (2000) (rejecting an 
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"automatic firearm exception" to the rule in Terry). 
Moreover, while there are ways to possess a gun illegally in 
the Territory--such as by possessing a gun with an altered 
serial number, see 18 U.S.C. S 922(k), or by possessing an 
unlicensed gun, see V.I. CODE A NN. tit. 14, S 2253(a)--the 
Virgin Islands legislature has not enacted a criminal statute 
prohibiting gun possession in a crowd or at a carnival. 
During the suppression hearing the Government adduced 
no evidence suggesting that either Leonard or his officer 
confreres was aware of any articulable facts suggesting that 
the gun Ubiles possessed was defaced or unlicensed, that 
Ubiles posed a safety risk to the authorities or the J'ouvert 
celebrants, or that Ubiles was acting in a manner indicating 
that he was involved in a different crime. For all the officers 
knew, even assuming the reliability of the tip that Ubiles 
possessed a gun, Ubiles was another celebrant lawfully 
exercising his right under Virgin Islands law to possess a 
gun in public. That is as much as Lockhart told Leonard 
and Officers Jackson and Garcia in pointing to Ubiles and 
informing them that Ubiles had a gun in his possession. 
 
This situation is no different than if Lockhart had told 
the officers that Ubiles possessed a wallet, a perfectly legal 
act in the Virgin Islands, and the authorities had stopped 
him for this reason. Though a search of that wallet may 
have revealed counterfeit bills--the possession of which is 
a crime under United States law, see 18 U.S.C. SS 471-72-- 
the officers would have had no justification to stop Ubiles 
based merely on information that he possessed a wallet, 
and the seized bills would have to be suppressed. The 
District Court's rationale for not suppressing thefirearm in 
this case is troubling, therefore, insofar as it seems to 
endorse the stop based on the fruits obtained as a result of 
the subsequent search. See Part I (reproducing the District 
Court's rationale). This post-hoc justification for stops and 
searches has been repeatedly rejected. See, e.g. , Florida v. 
J.L., 120 S. Ct. 1375, 1379 (2000) ("The reasonableness of 
official suspicion must be measured by what the officers 
knew before they conducted their search."). 
 
As with the case of the hypothetical wallet holder, the 
authorities here had no reason to know that Ubiles's gun 
was unregistered or that the serial number had been 
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altered. Moreover, they did not testify that it is common for 
people who carry guns in crowds--or crowds of drunken 
people--to either alter or fail to register their guns, or to 
use them to commit further crimes--all of which would be 
additional evidence giving rise to the inference that Ubiles 
may have illegally possessed his gun or that criminal 
activity was afoot. Therefore, as with the wallet holder, the 
authorities in this case had no reason to believe that Ubiles 
was engaged in or planning or preparing to engage in illegal 
activity due to his possession of a gun. Accordingly, in 
stopping him and subsequently searching him, the 
authorities infringed on Ubiles's Fourth Amendment rights. 
 
Lockhart's in-court testimony during Ubiles's trial does 
not undermine this conclusion. Lockhart testified at trial 
about how he saw Ubiles come to possess the gun. He 
stated that another man surreptitiously handed the gun to 
Ubiles, and that Ubiles slipped the gun into his pocket. The 
nature of this exchange could give rise to the inference that 
Ubiles was not the gun's owner. One could further infer 
based on this original inference, that, because Ubiles was 
not the gun's owner, he illegally possessed the gun, for it is 
illegal to possess a gun in the Virgin Islands that is not 
registered in your own name. See V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 14, 
S 2253(a); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 23, S 470. But there was no 
testimony introduced at the suppression hearing that 
Lockhart had told Leonard, before the search, that another 
man had surreptitiously handed the gun to Ubiles. As 
noted above, "[t]he reasonableness of official suspicion 
must be measured by what the officers knew before they 
conducted their search," J.L., 120 S. Ct. at 1379 (emphasis 
added); hence the Government cannot rely on this fact in 
arguing that Lockhart's testimony in this regard is relevant 
in assessing the constitutionality of the stop in question.3 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. In engaging in the analysis in the three paragraphs above, we intimate 
no view as to whether this additional hypothetical information would 
have been sufficient to warrant a finding of reasonable suspicion. The 
information would represent additional evidence (weighing in favor of a 
finding of reasonable suspicion) in " `the totality of the circumstances' 
" 
a court must consider in determining whether a stop was reasonable. 
United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 8 (1989) (quoting United States v. 
Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981)). 
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C. 
 
Nor can the Government rely on the fact that this stop 
took place during a crowded festival to make up for the lack 
of reasonable suspicion present in this case. We decline the 
Government's invitation to extend to crowds generally the 
Supreme Court's relaxed search and seizure jurisprudence 
dealing with close quarters, and the special risks attendant 
thereto, in airports and schools. In Florida v. J.L., the 
Supreme Court opined: 
 
       The facts of [Florida v. J.L.] do not require us to 
       speculate about the circumstances under which the 
       danger alleged in an anonymous tip might be so great 
       as to justify a search even without a showing of 
       reliability. We do not say, for example, . . . . that public 
       safety officials in quarters where the reasonable 
       expectation of Fourth Amendment privacy is 
       diminished, such as airports, see Florida v. Rodriguez, 
       469 U.S. 1 (1984) (per curiam), and schools, see New 
       Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985), cannot conduct 
       protective searches on the basis of information 
       insufficient to justify searches elsewhere. 
 
120 S. Ct. at 1380. 
 
We believe that neither the heightened safety concerns 
observed at airports, nor the pedagogical and safety 
concerns implicated at schools obtain any time a crowd of 
adults congregates. If that were not the case, citizens 
farming under the open skies of Washington or Vermont 
would generally have greater Fourth Amendment 
protections than their compatriots bustling to work in 
Manhattan or Boston. As a general proposition of 
constitutional law, this cannot be so; Terry applies equally 
in each of these locales. 
 
A California court of intermediate appeals reached a 
similar conclusion on similar facts: 
 
        This court believes that the fact that respondent was 
       in a [crowded] public [street] close to[presidential 
       candidate] Gary Hart is not relevant under the 
       circumstances of this case to the issue of whether 
       respondent had a legitimate expectation of privacy. . . . 
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       "[T]he Fourth Amendment's protections against 
       unreasonable seizure of effects upon the person 
       remains fully applicable." ([Oliver v. United States, 466 
       U.S. 170, 179 (1984)].) "[T]he Fourth Amendment 
       protects people--and not simply `areas'--against 
       unreasonable searches and seizures." (Katz v. United 
       States, [389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967)]). "Unquestionably 
       petitioner was entitled to the protection of the Fourth 
       Amendment as he walked down the street in 
       Cleveland." (Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968)). 
 
People v. Carlson, 233 Cal. Rptr. 236, 241 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1986); see id. at 241 n.5 (also rejecting the argument that 
because "any member of that crowd could have felt 
respondent's waist area, and it was arguably foreseeable 
that someone in the crowd would bump up against 
respondent and feel the area around his waist, then[the 
officer's] touch was limited to areas in `plain view,' 
accessible by members of the public"). We agree with this 
reasoning. 
 
III. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District 
Court will be reversed. The firearm seized from Ubiles 
should have been suppressed as the fruit of an unlawful 
seizure. 
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